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Abstract
The concept of dimension in simple games was introduced by Taylor and
Zwicker (1993) as a measure of the remoteness of a given game from a
weighted game. They demonstrated that the dimension of a simple game
can grow exponentially in the number of players. However, the problem of
worst-case growth of the dimension in complete games was left open. Freixas
and Puente (2008) showed that complete games of arbitrary dimension exist
and, in particular, their examples demonstrate that the worst-case growth
of dimension in complete games is at least linear. In this paper, using a
novel technique of Kurz and Napel (2015), we demonstrate that the growth
of dimension in complete games can also be exponential in the number of
players.
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1. Introduction
The past two decades have witnessed an explosion of interest in computa-
tional and representational issues related to coalitional games (see, e.g., Deng
and Papadimitriou (1994); Ieong and Shoham (2005)) and simple games, in
particular (see, e.g., De˘ıneko and Woeginger (2006); Elkind et al. (2008);
Faliszewski et al. (2009)). Simple games were introduced in their present
form by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) for applications in economics
but found a wide range of applications across several disciplines. In partic-
ular, simple games are used to model decision making in committees (Pe-
leg, 2002), reliability of real life systems made from unreliable components
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(Ramamurthy, 2012) and McCulloch-Pitts units in threshold logic (Muroga,
1971).
A simple game consists of a finite set of players and a set of winning
coalitions that satisfies the monotone property asserting that all supersets
of a winning coalition are also winning. One of the most important classes
of simple games is the class of weighted simple games. In a weighted simple
game every player is assigned a non-negative real weight so that a coalition
is winning if the total weight of its players is at least some predetermined
threshold. From the computational perspective weighted games are espe-
cially important since they can be succinctly represented by a finite sequence
of integers (Freixas, 1997). If we allow the weights and the threshold to
be vector-valued, then every simple game becomes weighted (Taylor and
Zwicker, 1993) and the smallest dimension of vectors which makes this rep-
resentation possible is called the dimension of the game.
Taylor and Zwicker (1999) demonstrated that the dimension of simple
games can grow exponentially in the number of players. Recently Olsen
et al. (2016) established the exact nature of this growth which is 2n−o(n),
where n is the number of players.
Another important class of simple games is the class of complete games
introduces by Carreras and Freixas (1996). In a complete game it is always
possible to say which player among any two players is at least as desirable
(as a coalition partner) as another one and, moreover, this desirability rela-
tion is a total order. This is a much broader class of games than weighted
games which includes, for example, conjunctive and disjunctive hierarchi-
cal games which appear as the access structures of popular secret sharing
schemes (Simmons, 1990; Tassa, 2007). Both disjunctive and conjunctive hi-
erarchical games are seldom weighted (Gvozdeva et al., 2013) or even roughly
weighted (Hameed and Slinko, 2015).
Freixas and Puente (2008) studied conjunctive hierarchical games (under
the name of games with a minimum) and found that their dimension grows
linearly in the number of players and asked whether or not in the class of
complete games the dimension can grow polynomially or even exponentially.
In the present paper we show that the growth of dimension of disjunctive hi-
erarchical games, which are complete, is exponential in the number of players.
This, in particular, fully answers the question of Freixas and Puente.
To obtain the aforementioned result we had to find a class of complete
games whose dimension grows very fast. We found this growth in the class of
disjunctive hierarchical games. We also turned our attention to conjunctive
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games for two reasons. Firstly, we fixed the gap in the aforementioned re-
sult of Freixas and Puente and also removed an unnesessary requirement of
absence of veto and dummy players. The gap in their theorem is non-trivial
and goes to the heart of the definition of dimension. In a way, this defini-
tion is less nice than Freixas and Puente thought. We devoted Section 4 for
clarification of this problem.
2. Preliminaries
Simple Games.
Let P be a set consisting of n players. For convenience P can be taken
to be [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Definition 1. A simple game is a pair G = (P,W ), where W is a subset of
the power set 2P which satisfies the monotonicity condition:
if X ∈ W and X ⊂ Y ⊆ P , then Y ∈ W .
Elements of the set W are called winning coalitions. We also define the set
L = 2P \W and call elements of this set losing coalitions. A winning coalition
is said to be minimal if every proper subset of it is a losing coalition. A losing
coalition is said to be maximal if every proper superset of it is winning. Due to
monotonicity, every simple game is fully determined by the set of its minimal
winning coalitions Wmin or the set of maximal losing coalitions Lmax.
Weighted Simple Games and Criteria of Weightedness.
Definition 2. A simple game G is called a weighted (majority) game if
there exist non-negative reals w1, . . . , wn, and a positive real number q, called
the quota, such that X ∈ W iff ∑i∈X wi ≥ q. Such a game is denoted
[q;w1, . . . , wn]. We also call [q;w1, . . . , wn] a voting representation for G.
Example 1. Let now n = 2k − 1 be odd and W be all subsets of P of
cardinality k or greater. There are exactly 2n−1 elements in W . This game
is called the simple majority voting game. It is weighted and [k; 1, 1, . . . , 1] is
its voting representation.
A more interesting example is
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Example 2. The UN Security Council consists of five permanent and 10
non-permanent members (which are sovereign states). A passage requires
approval of at least nine countries, subject to a veto by any one of the perma-
nent members. This is a weighted simple game with a voting representation
[39; 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1].
A sequence of coalitions
T = (X1, . . . , Xj;Y1, . . . , Yj)
of simple gameG is a trading transform of length j if the coalitionsX1, . . . , Xj
can be converted into the coalitions Y1, . . . , Yj by rearranging players. It can
also be expressed as
|{i : a ∈ Xi}| = |{i : a ∈ Yi}| for all a ∈ P .
A trading transform T is called a certificate of non-weightedness for G if
X1, . . . , Xj are winning in G and Y1, . . . , Yj are losing. The absence of certifi-
cates of non-weightedness of any length is a necessary and sufficient condition
of weightedness of the game G (Elgot, 1961; Taylor and Zwicker, 1999).
A more general class of games that we will touch upon is the class of
roughly weighted games (Gvozdeva et al., 2013).
Definition 3. A simple game G is called roughly weighted if there exist non-
negative real numbers w1, . . . , wn and a real number q, called the quota, not
all equal to zero, such that for a coalition X ∈ 2P the condition ∑i∈X wi < q
implies X is losing, and
∑
i∈X wi > q implies X is winning.
Weighted games and a roughly weighted games both have a system of
weights and a threshold. The difference is the treatment of coalitions on the
threshold. In the weighted case all of them are winning and in the roughly
weighted case both winning and losing coalitions can occur.
Finally a few words about duality.
Let G = (P,W ) be a simple game and L be the set of its losing coalitions.
We define the game G∗ = (P,W ∗) dual to G by setting
W ∗ = {P \X | X ∈ L},
i.e., the winning coalitions of G∗ are complements to the losing coalitions
of G.
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Complete and Hierarchical Simple Games.
Given a simple game G = (P,W ), after Isbell (1958), we define a relation
G on P by setting i G j if for every set X ⊆ P not containing i and j
X ∪ {j} ∈ W =⇒ X ∪ {i} ∈ W. (1)
In such a case we will say that i is at least as desirable (as a coalition partner)
as j. This relation is reflexive and transitive but not always complete (total)
(e.g., see Carreras and Freixas (1996)). The corresponding equivalence rela-
tion on [n] will be denoted ∼G and the strict desirability relation as G. If
this can cause no confusion we will omit the subscript G.
Definition 4. A game whose desirability relation is complete is called com-
plete.
Example 3. Any weighted game is complete.
Later we will have more examples. Complete simple games are a very
natural generalisation of weighted games. This class is much larger, however,
so measures of non-weightedness, e.g., the dimension, for such games are
important and interesting.
In a complete game G = (P,W ) the set of players P is partitioned into
equivalence classes P = P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pm with respect to ∼G. Without loss of
generality we will consider that
P1 G P2 G . . . G Pm. (2)
Such game G is called m-partite.
Any coalition X ⊆ P defines a multiset {1`1 , . . . ,m`m}, where `i is the
number of elements from Pi in X. Due to completeness, the status of a
coalition X, i.e., whether it is winning or losing, can be deduced from this
multiset. The multisets corresponding to winning coalitions will be called
models of winning coalitions. We can also define models of losing coalitions,
respectively.
In a complete game G = (P,W ) a winning coalition X is shift-minimal
if any coalition (X \ {i}) ∪ {j} is losing for any i ∈ X and j /∈ X such that
i G j, i.e., it ceases to be winning after any replacement of its player with a
less desirable one. A losing coalition Y is called shift-maximal if it becomes
winning after a replacement of any player with a more desirable player. A
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complete simple game is fully defined by the set of its shift-minimal winning
coalitions or a set of its shift-maximal losing coalitions.
Suppose now that the set of players P is partitioned into m disjoint
subsets P = ∪mi=1Pi and let k1 < k2 < . . . < km be a sequence of positive
integers. Let k = (k1, . . . , km). Then we define the game H = H∃(P,k) by
setting the set of winning coalitions to be
W∃ =
{
X ∈ 2P | ∃i (∣∣X ∩ (∪ij=1Pi)∣∣ ≥ ki)} .
Such a game is called a disjunctive hierarchical game. It has m thresholds
and one of them must be reached for the coalition to be winning.
Suppose now that the set of players P is partitioned into m disjoint
subsets P = ∪mi=1Pi, and let k1 < . . . < km−1 ≤ km be a sequence of positive
integers. Then we define the game H∀(P,k) by setting the set of its winning
coalitions to be
W∀ =
{
X ∈ 2P | ∀i (∣∣X ∩ (∪ij=1Pi)∣∣ ≥ ki)} .
Such a game is called a conjunctive hierarchical game. It has m thresholds
and all of them must be reached for the coalition to be winning.
Both classes of hierarchical games are complete. Gvozdeva et al. (2013)
give a sufficient and necessary conditions for the game H∀(P,k) defined above
to be truly m-partite1. We denote |Pi| = ni, then the following two conditions
jointly are necessary and sufficient:
k1 ≤ n1, (3)
ki < ki−1 + ni (4)
for every i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}. Moreover, Gvozdeva et al. (2013) showed that G
has veto players if and only if k1 = n1, in which case P1 is the set of veto
players, and G has dummy players if and only if km−1 = km, in which case
Pm is the set of dummy players.
We note that these conditions imply
ki ≤ n1 + . . .+ ni − (i− 1). (5)
1For some combinations of parameters the number of equivalence classes may in fact
be less than m.
6
for all i = 1, . . . ,m, and
ni > 1. (6)
for all 1 < i < m, moreover, it is also true for i = m in the absence of dummy
players. The first inequality follows from (4). In particular, it shows that
the equation ki = n1 + . . .+ ni can be satisfied only when i = 1. The second
also follows from (4) since
ni > ki − ki−1 ≥ 1
(for i = m this needs km 6= km−1, which means no dummies.
Lemma 1. Let G = (P,W ) be an m-partite simple game with P = P1∪P2∪
. . . ∪ Pm, where P1 consists of veto players and Pm of dummy players. Let
A = P1 ∪ Pm. Then the reduced game GA is defined on the set of players
P2 ∪ . . . ∪ Pm−1 and does not have veto or dummy players).
Proof. Due to Proposition 5 of Gvozdeva et al. (2013) GA is an (m − 2)-
partite conjunctive hierarchical game with n′ = (n2, . . . , nm−1) and with the
vector of thresholds
k′ = (k2 − k1, . . . , km−1 − k1).
Since n2 > k2−k1 this game does not have veto players and since km−2−k1 <
km−1 − k1 it does not have dummies.
Definition of the Dimension. The Criterion of Kurz and Napel.
The dimension of a simple game G is the minimum dimension of the
vectors required to express it as a vector-weighted game (Taylor and Zwicker,
1993). That is, a simple game has dimension k if it can be represented as
a vector-weighted game with weights from Rk, but not with weights from
R` for ` < k. In practice it is more convenient to work with the following
equivalent definition.
Let Gi = (P,Wi), i = 1, . . . , n, be simple games on the same set of
players P . Then the intersection of these games is the simple game G =
(P,W ), where W = W1 ∩ W2 ∩ · · · ∩ Wn. In other words, a coalition is
winning in G if and only if it is winning in Gi for each i = 1, . . . , n. We write
G = G1 ∧ . . . ∧Gn for reasons that will be revealed later.
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Definition 5. A simple game has dimension d if it can be represented as the
intersection of d weighted games but cannot be represented as the intersection
of ` weighted games for ` < d. We will denote the dimension of G by dim(G).
Examples of games of dimension 2 include the United States Federal
System and the procedure to amend the Canadian Constitution (Taylor and
Zwicker, 1999). Freixas (2004) showed that the dimension of the European
Union Council under the Nice rules had dimension 3. In a recent article Kurz
and Napel (2015) have found that the revised voting rules of the Council of
the European Union (EU Council) mean that a simple game representation
of that voting body must have dimension at least 7. This is significantly
larger than that of any other known simple game that occurs in the real
world.
To calculate the dimension of a game exactly is not an easy task. De˘ıneko
and Woeginger (2006) proved that the following problem is NP-hard: given
k weighted majority games on the same set of players, decide whether the
dimension of their intersection is exactly k.
To bound the dimension of a game from above the following observation
can be used (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999).
Proposition 1. The dimension of a simple game G = (P,W ) is at most the
cardinality |Lmax| of the set Lmax of maximal losing coalitions of G.
To bound the dimension of a game from below we will use the following
useful criterion, which is Observation 1 in Kurz and Napel (2015). It is so
important that we call it a theorem.
Theorem 1. Let G = (P,W ) be a simple game, and let S = {Y1, . . . , Yk}
be a set of losing coalitions such that for each pair {Yi, Yj} with i 6= j, there
is no weighted simple game for which every coalition in W is winning but Yi
and Yj are both losing. Then the dimension of G is at least |S| = k.
Kurz and Napel refer to these elements of S as pairwise incompatible.
One way to use this theorem to prove that a simple game G has dimension at
least k is to find, for every pair {Yi, Yj} ⊆ S, a certificate of non-weightedness
(X1i,j, X
2
i,j;Yi, Yj), where X
1
i,j, and X
2
i,j are both winning in G.
3. The Main Results
Dimension of Disjunctive Hierarchical Games.
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Firstly, let us consider a non-weighted example of a disjunctive hierarchi-
cal game with the ‘smallest’ possible vector k. This would be k = (2, 4) (as in
non-trivial cases we have k1 ≥ 2 and the games with k = (2, 3) are weighted
(Gvozdeva et al., 2013)). Although not weighted, it is known (Gvozdeva
et al., 2013), that the game with this set of parameters is always roughly
weighted.
Proposition 2. Let d ≥ 2 be a positive integer. Let P = P0 ∪ P1 with
|P0| = d, |P1| = 2d, and k = (2, 4). Then the disjunctive hierarchical game
H = H∃(P,k) has dimension at least d.
Proof. Let P0 = {a0, . . . , ad−1} and P1 = {b0, . . . , b2d−1}, define the sets
Yi = {ai, b2i, b2i+1}, i = 0, . . . , d−1, and let S = {Y0, . . . , Yd−1}. All coalitions
from S lose in H since they have neither two players from P1, nor four players
in total. Then S satisfies the conditions of the Kurz-Napel criterion since if
i 6= j
({ai, aj}, {b2i, b2i+1, b2j, b2j+1};Yi, Yj)
is a certificate of non-weightedness for H as the coalitions X1i,j = {ai, aj}
and X2i,j = {b2i, b2i+1, b2j, b2j+1} are both winning (the first achieves the first
threshold and the second achieves the second). By the criterion, the dimen-
sion of H is at least d.
Thus we have the following result.
Theorem 2. There exist roughly weighted games of arbitrary large dimen-
sion.
Interestingly, we showed that we can get linear growth in the number of
players without increasing the number of classes of equivalent players. If we
start increasing both we will get a growth faster than linear.
Lemma 2. Let P = P0 ∪ P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pm−1 with |P0| = k, |P1| = |P2| = · · · =
|Pm−1| = 2k and k = (2, 4, 6, . . . , 2m). Then the disjunctive hierarchical
simple game H = H∃(P,k) has dimension d satisfying
km−1 ≤ d ≤ km(2k − 1)m−1. (7)
Proof. Let P0 = {a1, . . . , ak} and denote by p(j)i , j ∈ {0, . . . , 2k − 1}, the
jth player from part Pi. We will also denote P
(j)
i = {p(2j)i , p(2j+1)i }, where
j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} and i ∈ [m]. Then all coalitions of the form
{ai0} ∪ P (i1)1 ∪ P (i2)2 ∪ · · · ∪ P (im−2)m−2 ∪ P (i
′)
m−1, (8)
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where i′ = i0 + i1 + . . . + im−2 (mod k) will form the set S to be used in
the Kurz-Napel criterion. Firstly, we note that all the coalitions in S are
losing as no threshold is achieved. Let us show that any two of them are
incompatible. Let
Y1 = {ai0} ∪ P (i1)1 ∪ P (i2)2 ∪ · · · ∪ P (im−2)m−2 ∪ P (i
′)
m−1,
Y2 = {aj0} ∪ P (j1)1 ∪ P (j2)2 ∪ · · · ∪ P (jm−2)m−2 ∪ P (j
′)
m−1,
be two coalitions from S. There are two cases.
• If i0 = j0, then there is at least one ` ∈ {1, . . . ,m−2} for which i` 6= j`
(otherwise the coalitions would be identical), so P
(i`)
` is disjoint from
P
(j`)
` . If ir = jr for all r ∈ {1, . . . , `− 1, `+ 1, . . . ,m− 2}, then i′ 6= j′ ,
thus we may assume that there exists also r ∈ [m− 1] such that r 6= `
and ir 6= jr. Without loss of generality assume that ` < r. Then we
get a certificate of non-weightedness
(Y1 ∪ {p(2j`)` } \ P (ir)r , (Y2 \ {p(2j`)` } ∪ P (ir)r ;Y1, Y2).
by swapping one element {p(2j`)` } of Y2 for two elements of P (ir)r from
Y1. After the swap the first coalition will be winning since the `-th
threshold is achieved and the second will be also winning since the r-th
threshold is achieved.
• If i0 6= j0 but ir = jr for all r ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 2}, then i′ 6= j′, hence we
may assume that there exists r ∈ [m−1] such that ir 6= jr. In this case
we get a certificate of non-weightedness
(Y1 ∪ {aj0} \ P (ir)r , (Y2 \ {aj0} ∪ P (ir)r ;Y1, Y2)
by swapping {aj0} and P (ir)r .
Since |S| = km−1, by Theorem 1, this means that the dimension of such a
game is at least km−1.
The upper bound is easily calculated with the help of Proposition 1 taking
in consideration that each maximal losing coalition consists of one member
from P0 and two members from each of the P1, . . . , Pn.
Theorem 3. In the class of disjunctive hierarchical games with bounded
number of equivalence classes the worst-case growth of dimension is polyno-
mial.
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Proof. If in (7) we fix m, then we have (2k + 1)m voters which is linear in k
and the dimension which is polynomial in k. Hence the dimension growth is
polynomial of degree m.
Theorem 4. In the class of disjunctive hierarchical games with bounded
number of players in equivalence classes the worst-case growth of dimension
is exponential.
Proof. If in (7) we fix k, then we have (2k + 1)m voters which is linear in
m and the dimension is exponential in m. Hence the dimension growth is
exponential in m.
These results answer directly the question from Freixas and Puente (2008)
about possibility of a polynomial or exponential growth in complete simple
games.
Dimension of Conjunctive Hierarchical Games.
Freixas and Puente (2008) studied a class of games, that they called
games with minimum, which, as was proved in Gvozdeva et al. (2013), is
nothing other than the class of conjunctive hierarchical games. The theo-
rem they formulated state that the dimension d of an m-partite conjunctive
hierarchical game without veto or dummy players satisfies the inequalities
dm
2
e ≤ d ≤ m. However, we have to reprove the lower bound in this theo-
rem due to two reasons: 1) the gap in their proof which will be explained
in the next section after rectification of the concept of dimension; 2) the
unnecessary requirement of having no dummies or vetoers.
But, firstly, we will give a simple proof of the upper bound as well getting
rid of unnecessary requirement of having no dummies or vetoers.
Proposition 3. The dimension d of an m-partite conjunctive hierarchical
game is at most m.
Proof. Let H = H∀(P,k), where P = P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pm with k = (k1, . . . , km),
and suppose the game is m-partite. Let us denote n = |P |. Let us define m
weight functions on P by
ws(p) =
{
1, if p ∈ P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ps
0, if p ∈ Ps+1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pm
and m thresholds qs = ks, s ∈ [m]. We define game Gs on P by the weight
function ws and threshold qs. It is clear that a coalition X wins in Gs if and
only if
∣∣X ∩ (∪sj=1Pi)∣∣ ≥ ks, hence H = G1 ∧ . . . ∧Gm and d ≤ m.
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We will need the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let H = H∀(P,k) be m-partite conjunctive hierarchical game
with P = P1 ∪ · · · ∪ Pm being the equivalence classes of ∼H , |Pi| = ni and
k = (k1, . . . , km). Then, if no dummies present, any shift-maximal losing
coalition of H corresponds to one of the following m models:
Mi = {1a1 , . . . , iai , (i+ 1)ni+1 , . . . ,mnm} (i = 1, . . . ,m),
where a1, . . . , ai satisfy the following conditions:
(i) a1 + . . .+ ai = ki − 1;
(ii) If 0 < at for t ≤ i, then as = ns for all s < t;
(iii) ai < ni.
If dummies present, then the model Mm does not exist and we have only
m− 1 models.
Proof. Suppose the last mth level does not consist of dummies. Suppose that
a maximal losing coalition X fails the ith condition, i.e., in the first i levels
there are no ki elements, that is, a1+ . . .+ai < ki. Due to (5) we may assume
that a1 + . . .+ai = ki−1. Since the ith threshold is already violated, we can
include all elements of Pi+1∪· · ·∪Pm without making this coalition winning.
If for i ≤ t we have at > 0 but at−1 < nt−1, then we can replace one element
of level t with element of level t− 1 without making coalition winning. As X
was shift-maximal, this is not possible. If the mth level consists of dummies,
then km−1 = km so it is impossible to fail just one last threshold. Finally, if
ai = ni, then by (ii) we have as = ns for all s = 1, . . . , i − 1, in which case
X = P .
We illustrate this lemma with an example.
Example 4. Let us consider the game H∀(P,k), where |P1| = |P2| = |P3| =
4, and k = (2, 4, 7). Then there are three models of shift-maximal losing
coalitions:
{1, 24, 34}, {13, 34}, {14, 22}.
The first type of coalitions fail the first threshold, the second type of coalitions
fail the second threshold and the third type of coalitions fail the third threshold.
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We can now prove the main result of this subsection.
Theorem 5. The dimension d of an m-partite conjunctive hierarchical game
H satisfies dm−1
2
e ≤ d ≤ m. If H has no dummy players, then dm
2
e ≤ d ≤ m.
Proof. It is easy to see that adding a level of dummy players does not change
the dimension of the game so we may assume that H has no dummy players.
To prove the lower bound we assume that there are ` < dm
2
e weighted games
H1, . . . , H` such that H = H1 ∧ . . .∧H`. Then, in each game Hi, all winning
coalitions of H are winning and if a coalition is losing, then it is losing in one
of the Hi.
So there are ` < m/2 games H1, . . . , H` but by Lemma 3 we have m
shift-maximal losing coalitions. Hence, due to the pigeonhole principle there
exist an index i such that in Hi at least three shift-maximal losing coalitions
of H, belonging to different models, are losing in Hi. Then there are two
coalitions among these, say L1 and L2, whose corresponding models, sayMi
and Mj, satisfy i+ 2 ≤ j. Then
L1 = C1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ci ∪ Pi+1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pm,
L2 = D1 ∪ . . . ∪Dj ∪ Pj+1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pm,
where Ci ⊆ Pi, Di ⊆ Pi, moreover, by Lemma 3 (i) we have |C1|+ . . .+ |Ci| =
ki − 1 and |D1|+ . . .+ |Dj| = kj − 1 with |Ci| < ni and |Dj| < nj. We note
that Lemma 3 also implies that |Cs| ≤ |Ds| for s ∈ [i].
Let s ∈ [j] be the largest positive integer with Ds 6= ∅. Then |D1|+ . . .+
|Ds| = |D1|+ . . .+ |Dj| = kj − 1. Suppose s ≤ i. As kj − 1 ≥ kj−1 > ki, we
have |Cs| < |Ds|. If s > i, then Di = Pi and |Ci| < |Di| is also true. Thus, a
transfer of a player, say x, from Ds to Cs in the first case and from Di to Ci
in the second, is possible. Let us do this transfer and, for simplicity, let us
keep notation for these sets unchanged.
After the transfer we will have
|D1|+ . . .+ |Dj| = kj − 2, (9)
i.e., the jth threshold will become further from reach but let us show that
for any t ∈ [j−1] the t-th threshold is still reached for L2 \{x}. If Dj−1 = ∅,
this is clear. If Dj−1 6= ∅, then by Lemma 3 (ii) we have Dr = Pr for all
r ∈ [j − 2]. Due to (5) we see that only (j − 1)th threshold may be violated
by L2 \ {x}. After the transfer we have, however, by (5)
|D1|+ . . .+ |Dj−1| = n1 + . . .+ nj−1 − 1 ≥ kj−1 + (j − 3) ≥ kj−1
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since j ≥ i+ 2 ≥ 3.
Now since i < j−1 we have L1 ⊃ Pj. If Dj−1 = Pj−1, then by (5) and (9)
nj − |Dj| = n1 + . . .+ nj − (kj − 2) ≥ 2,
and by (6) there is a capacity to move two elements from Cj to Dj. If
Dj−1 6= Pj−1, then Dj = ∅ and again there is a capacity to move two elements
from Cj to Dj. Suppose the elements transferred are y, z ∈ Cj. This transfer
will make (L2 \ {x}) ∪ {y, z} winning.
Let us now notice that for L1 before the transfer we had
|C1|+ . . .+ |Ci|+ |Pi+1|+ . . .+ |Pr| ≥ kr + (r − i)
for any r ≥ j. Indeed, by (4)
|C1|+ . . .+ |Ci|+ |Pi+1|+ . . .+ |Pr| = ki − 1 +
r∑
t=i+1
nt
≥ ki − 1 +
r∑
t=i+1
(kt − kt−1 − 1) = kr + (r − i).
This means that (L1 ∪ {x}) \ {y, z} is winning as well. We obtained a cer-
tificate of non-weightedness
((L1 ∪ {x}) \ {y, z}, (L2 \ {x}) ∪ {y, z};L1, L2)
which gives us a contradiction.
The only way we can grow the dimension in hierarchical conjunctive
games is to increase the number m of equivalence classes. This was not
the case whith disjunctive hierarchical games.
Theorems 4 and 5 demonstrate that, inter alia, the dimension is not
preserved under duality. Indeed, it is known (Gvozdeva et al., 2013) that the
duality takes us from disjunctive hierarchical games to conjunctive ones and
vice versa and their respective growth of dimension are very different.
Codimension.
A concept closely related to dimension is that of the codimension.
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Definition 6. The codimension of a simple game is the minimum number
of weighted simple games whose union forms the given game. That is, the
simple game G = (P,W ) has codimension n if W = W1∪· · ·∪Wn, where each
of the games (P,W1), . . . , (P,Wn) is weighted, and W cannot be represented
as the union of fewer than n weighted games. We will denote the codimension
of G by codim(G).
This concept emerges in relation to the duality of games.
Theorem 6 (Freixas-Marciniak, 2009). If G is a simple game, then
codim(G∗) = dim(G).
Proof. This is a simplification of Theorem 3.2(ii) in Freixas and Marciniak
(2009), in which we take C to be the class of weighted simple games, along
with their observation that this class is closed under duality.
Due to Freixas-Marciniak theorem we can extract some consequences from
our results with respect to codimension.
Corollary 1. The codimension d of an m-partite disjunctive hierarchical
game satisfies dm
2
e − 1 ≤ d ≤ m.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 5 and the fact that the dual game to a disjunc-
tive hierarchical game is conjunctive hierarchical (Gvozdeva et al., 2013).
Corollary 2. There is a sequence of conjunctive hierarchical games whose
codimensions grow exponentially in the number of players.
4. Problems with the concept of dimension
There are several worrying properties of the concept of dimension. One
of these can be observed from the results of this paper, namely, that the
dimension is not preserved under duality. Indeed, in Gvozdeva et al. (2013)
it was proved that the dual of a disjunctive hierarchical games is a conjunctive
hierarchical games and vice versa. However, Theorems 4 and 5 show that
the dimensions of games in these classes are very different. Another problem
with this concept is illustrated in the following example.
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Motivating example.2 It shows that when one represents a complete
game G as an intersection of weighted games, it may be impossible to choose
the weightings in a way that faithfully represents the desirability order G
in G.
Let P = P1 ∪ P2 with |P1| = 2 and |P2| = 5. Consider a disjunctive
hierarchical game H = H∃(P,k) with k = (2, 5). Frstly, let us consider P as
a multiset {12, 25}, i.e., consisting of two identical players of type 1 and five
of type 2. We ask if it is possible to find games H1, . . . , Hk, where in the ith
game weight wi(1) is assigned to all players of the first type, weight wi(2)]
to players of the second type and the threshold is qi.
Considering classes of equivalent coalitions of H as submultisets, we can
graphically represent them as points in R representing the coalition {1x, 2y}
as point (x, y). Thus, the minimal winning ones are {12}, {1, 24}, {25} will
be represented as points (2, 0), (1, 4), (0, 5). We can graphically depict them
on the following diagram where the area of winning coalitions is presented in
grey.
Figure 1: Vertical axis x shows the number of players of the first type and
horizontal axis y of the second.
If it was possible to find weight functions w1, w2 and thresholds q1, q2, then
The set of winning coalitions of H will be convex. This grey area is not
convex; its convex hull also contains the point corresponding to the only
maximal losing coalition {1, 23}. This means that the games H1, . . . , Hk
cannot be found. What can be done?
Let P1 = {b1, b2} and P2 = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5}. Consider the two following
representations:
First representation. We define two weighted games G1 = (P,W1) and
2The example we present in this section is the result of an email discussion with Bill
Zwicker.
16
G2 = (P,W2) as follows:
w1(b1) = 4, w1(b2) = 1.1,
∀j∈[5] w1(cj) = 1 and quota = 5.
and
w1(b1) = 1.1, w1(b2) = 4,
∀j∈[5] w1(cj) = 1 and quota = 5.
Obviously, H = G1 ∩G2 and, since H is not weighted, we have dimH = 2.
Second representation. The above representation failed to represent
the ‘equivalence’ part of ∼H for the players of P1, but did succeed with the
P2 players (in that they did get equal weight for each of the two weightings).
Next, we look at a representation that switches roles: it similarly repre-
sents the strict part of ∼H for all players, and it gives the P1 players equal
weight for each of the weightings (but the five players of P2 get different
weights). For every subset X ⊂ [5] such that |X| = 3 we define a game
GX = (P,WX) by
wX(b1) = wX(b2) = 3,
∀i∈X wX(ci) = 2, ∀i/∈X wX(ci) = 0,
quota = 6
There are 10 such sets X of cardinality 3, and thus 10 weighted games, and
it is easy to show that their intersection is the hierarchical game H. The
nice property of this particular vector of weightings is that it respects the
‘strict’ part ∼H of the individual desirability order of H in the following
sense: x ≺H y iff wX(x) < wX(y) holds for each three-element subset X of
[5].
This example explains why the lower bound in the theorem of Freixas and
Puente (Theorem 2) had to be reproved. In their proof of the lower bound
they allowed only weighted games that assign equal weights to players who
are equivalent in the original game. We see that this was not sufficient to
claim that the lower bound in their theorem holds.
Boolean dimension of simple games.
Boolean dimension of a simple game was introduced in Faliszewski et al.
(2009). Let Φ = {p, q, . . .} be a set of propositional variables and let L denote
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the set of (well-formed) formulas of the first-order propositional logic over Φ
containing only logical connectives ∧ and ∨3. For a formula φ ∈ L let |φ| be
the number of variables used to express φ. Suppose also > is a tautology and
⊥ is a contradiction. Let Gi = (P,Wi), i = 1, . . . , q, be simple games with
the same set of players P . We will define the game G = (P,W ) by setting
for a coalition C ⊆ P
C ∈ W := φ(C ∈ W1, . . . , C ∈ Wq) = >.
We will denote this game φ(G1, . . . , Gq). We illustrate this definition with
the following simple games which plays an important role in the theory of
secret sharing (Beimel et al., 2008). They are called there tripartite.
Example 5. Let n = (n1, n2, n3) and k = (k1, k2, k3), where n1, n2, n3 and
k1, k2, k3 are positive integers. The game ∆1(n,k) is defined on the set
P = P1 ∪ P2 ∪ P3 which is a union of disjoint sets P1, P2, P3 of cardinali-
ties n1, n2, n3, respectively,. A coalition C = C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3, where Ci ⊆ Pi,
i = 1, 2, 3, is winning iff
(|C1| ≥ k1) ∨ [(|C1|+ |C2| ≥ k2) ∧ (|C1|+ |C2|+ |C3| ≥ k3)] = >,
where k1 < k3, k2 < k3, n1 ≥ k1, n2 > k2 − k1 and n3 > k3 − k2.
Obviously, it is organised as G1 ∨ (G2 ∧ G3), where G1, G2, G3 are weighted
games.
Definition 7. Let G be a simple game. The smallest positive integer d
such that G can be represented as G = φ(G1, . . . , Gn), where G1, . . . , Gn are
weighted simple games, and |φ| = d is called the Boolean dimension of G.
The Boolean dimension of the game ∆1(n,k) from Example 5 is obvi-
ously 3 while its classical dimension may (and certainly will) depend on the
parameters n and k. The revised voting rules of the Council of the European
Union also has Boolean dimension 3.
Apart from a better ability to reflect the descriptive complexity of games,
the Boolean dimension has some nice properties absent in the classical di-
mension.
3In paper by Faliszewski et al. (2009) negations were also allowed, however, the authors
of that paper considered also non-monotonic simple games which we do not consider.
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Proposition 4. The Boolean dimension of a simple game is equal to the
Boolean dimension of its dual.
Proof. Let Gi = (P,Wi), i = 1, 2, be a simple game and G
∗
i = (P,W
∗
i ),
i = 1, 2, be their dual games. Taylor and Zwicker (1999) (see, e.g., Proposi-
tion 1.4.3) showed that the following two de Morgan laws are satisfied
(W1 ∪W2)∗ = W ∗1 ∩W ∗2 ,
(W1 ∩W2)∗ = W ∗1 ∪W ∗2 .
From here it immediately follows that
(G1 ∨G2)∗ = G∗1 ∧G∗2,
(G1 ∧G2)∗ = G∗1 ∨G∗2,
which imply the statement.
However, some features of Boolean dimension are the same as the corre-
sponding features of dimension. In particular, as is the case for dimension,
in general the calculation of the exact Boolean dimension of a simple game
is NP-hard (Faliszewski et al., 2009).
5. Conclusion and open questions
We have answered a question of Freixas and Puente (2008) by showing
that the dimension of a complete simple game can grow exponentially in the
number of players. The games used to demonstrate this are the disjunctive
hierarchical games. We have discussed the pitfalls of the concept of dimen-
sion and found some disturbing features of it which led us to reproving and
strengthening the theorem of Freixas and Puente about the range in which
the dimension of a conjunctive hierarchical game may lie. This research
prompts the following questions:
• Can anything be said about the Boolean dimension of a complete game?
• Let G = (P,W ) be a complete game with equivalence classes for the
desirability relation P1, . . . , Pm so that P = P1 ∪ . . . ,∪Pm. Then for
each i ∈ [m] does there exist a representation of G as an intersection
of weighted games such that each game in this representation assigns
equal weights to players from Pi and respects the strict part of the
desirability order G?
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